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REGULATING THE POLITICAL WILD WEST:  STATE 





Victoria Smith Ekstrand* & Ashley Fox** 
 
 
The problem of disinformation in online political advertising is growing, with 
ongoing and potential threats to campaigns coming from both within and outside the 
United States.  Most scholarship in this area has focused on either disclosures and 
disclaimers under the proposed Honest Ads Act or other fixes aimed at a gridlocked 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).  With federal reform at a standstill, states 
have jumped into the void.  Between the 2016 presidential election and early 2020, 
eight states passed legislation to expressly regulate online political advertising for 
state candidates and ballot measures, including Maryland, whose state law was 
declared unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs by a federal 
appellate court.  This Article examines these state laws as well as the one federal 
appellate court opinion as a springboard for thinking about efforts at the national 
level to address the problem.  We raise important considerations for future legislation 
in light of the appellate court decision.  We propose that a law establishing 
independent record-keeping bodies, similar to those the state of New York has 
established for independent expenditure committees, is more likely to pass First 
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 INTRODUCTION  
 
On February 16, 2018, U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted thirteen 
Russians and three Russian organizations for interfering with the U.S. political and 
electoral process, including the 2016 presidential election.1  The indictment spelled 
out “in exhaustive detail the breadth and systematic nature of this conspiracy, dating 
back to 2014, as well as the multiple ways in which Russian actors misused online 
platforms to carry out their clandestine operations.” 2   Part of the Russian 
disinformation campaign included “expenditures to carry out those activities, 
 
1 Exposing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements, 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., 
https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
2 Id.  
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including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. 
persons and entities.”3  The Russians purchased numerous ads on social media that 
promoted the accounts of disinformation groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience 
members as well as ads that attacked the Clinton campaign and promoted the Trump 
campaign.4  For example, the Russians promoted an account “Black Matters” calling 
for a “flash mob” of U.S. persons to “take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 
or #noHillary2016.”5  They also created ads for an Instagram account “Tea Party 
News,” asking U.S. persons to help them “make a patriotic team of young Trump 
supporters” by uploading photos with the hashtag “#KIDS4TRUMP.”6  The Mueller 
investigation and subsequent report prompted questions around a largely unregulated 
online political advertising landscape. 
 The problem of online political ads pushing disinformation is growing, 
according to experts, with ongoing and potential threats to campaigns from both 
within and outside the United States.  From a First Amendment perspective, the 
problem is compounded by the emerging difficulty of distinguishing traditional, 
regulated political advertising from general, largely unregulated political content.  In 
November 2019, the New York Times reported that a search for videos of Senator 
Kamala Harris revealed dozens of videos claiming Senator Harris is not an American 
citizen.7   Should such content be treated as traditional political advertising or as 
political content?  Is pointing out the falsehoods enough in a growing environment of 
fake bots and trolls?  The constitutionality of any potential regulation of online 
political ads begins with both defining the environment and the harms.  But that task 
is difficult, as the lines between traditional political advertising and general political 
content continue to blur.  
 Furthermore, the threats posed by mis- and disinformation are increasingly 
coming from within the United States, according to researchers.8  That is in part 
because online political advertising is dominated by two American platforms: 
Google (37.2%) and Facebook (19.6%) “make up a majority of the online ad 
 
3 Indictment at 4, United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(No. 18-cr-0032-2 (DLF)), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download.  
4 Id. at 18–19, 21–22, 25–27, 30. 
5  SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, I REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 25 (2019). 
6 Id. 
7  Jonathan Martin et al., How Kamala Harris’s Campaign Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/29/us/politics/kamala-harris-2020.html. 
8 According to Paul Barrett, deputy director of New York University’s Stern Center for Business and 
Human Rights and author of a report showing an increasing threat from within the United States, “[i]t’s likely 
that there will be a high volume of misinformation and disinformation pegged to the 2020 election, with the 
majority of it being generated right here in the United States, as opposed to coming from overseas.”  Alexandra 
S. Levine et al., Why the Fight Against Disinformation, Sham Accounts and Trolls Won’t Be Any Easier in 2020, 
POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2019, 6:49 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/01/fight-against-disinformation-
2020-election-074422; see also Sonam Sheth, “The Country is in a State of Trauma;” COVID-19 Has Made the 
US a Breeding Ground for Propoganda and a Goldmine for Foreign Spies, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2020, 11:25 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-trump-us-disinformation-foreign-interference-2020-4 
(reporting that Barrett “told Insider he’s seen an explosion of domestically sourced dis- and misinformation 
related to the [Covid-19] outbreak”). 
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market” in the United States and “accounted for 99% of the industry’s revenue 
growth” in 2016.9  According to one estimate in November 2019, more than $67 
million had been spent by the 2020 presidential candidates on Facebook, $32 
million on Google, and $5.2 million on Twitter—all since the platforms and social 
media sites began tracking such purchases themselves in 2018 (see Figure One).10 
 
Figure One: 2020 Digital Ad Wars11  
 
With such explosive and unregulated growth in the online political ad market, the 
potential effect on future elections is both immediate and alarming. 
 Reaction to such threats has been swift, but actual movement to address the 
problem is slow and uncertain, due primarily to the scale of the problem, political 
gridlock, and debate about how best to address the problem.  The platforms, 
particularly under fire since the Mueller investigation, have announced immediate 
changes.  Twitter announced in fall 2019 it will reject all political advertising,12 
 
9  Katherine Haenschen & Jordan Wolf, Disclaiming Responsibility: How Platforms Deadlocked the 
Federal Election Commission’s Efforts to Regulate Digital Political Advertising, TELECOMM. POL’Y, Sept. 
2019, at 1, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596118304105. 
10  Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, 2020 Presidential Candidates Top $100M in Digital Ad 
Spending as Twitter Goes Dark, OPEN SECRETS (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/11/digital-ad-spending-2020-presidential-candidates-top-100m/.  
11 Id. 
12  Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952.  
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prompting criticism about exactly how political advertising will be defined. 13  
Facebook announced it will not fact-check political ads because of its commitment to 
free expression and an open marketplace of ideas.14  Facebook and Google announced 
plans to instead limit microtargeting, the process by which campaigns and interest 
groups send messages to small and highly selective groups of people.15  Critics say 
microtargeting contributes to voter manipulation, invasions of privacy, and voter 
exclusion. 16   More broadly, the practice has been criticized for fragmenting a 
democratic commitment to the marketplace of ideas.17  Other platforms have made 
self-regulatory moves, but the industry-led moves change regularly with each new 
problem encountered (see Figure Two).  The needs are immediate, but the potential 
solutions are too complicated to be effectively and immediately implemented by any 
one new platform, policy, or law.  
 
13 Shannon C. McGregor, Why Twitter’s Ban On Political Ads Isn’t as Good as it Sounds, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/04/twitters-political-ads-ban. 
14 Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Defiant Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebook-free-speech.html; 
see also Tony Romm, Zuckerberg: Standing for Voice and Free Expression, WASH. POST (Oct. 17 2019, 4:22 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/17/zuckerberg-standing-voice-free-expression/. 
15 Alex Hern, Facebook to Curb Microtargeting in Political Advertising, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019, 
1:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/22/facebook-to-curb-microtargeting-in-
political-advertising. 
16 Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for 
Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 82, 87 (2018). 
17 Id. at 89. 
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Figure Two: Platform Political Ad Policies18 
 
 While political communication scholars have been actively writing about the 
problem of online political advertising for several years, legal scholars have just 
begun to focus on the issue.19  Most of the legal scholarship has been focused on the 
federal level, addressing either the proposed Honest Ads Act20 or other fixes aimed at 
a gridlocked Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).21   With federal reform at a 
standstill, states have jumped into the void.  Between the 2016 presidential election 
and early 2020, eight states passed legislation to expressly regulate online political 
advertising for state candidates and ballot measures,22 including Maryland, whose 
state law was declared unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs by a 
federal appellate court.23  The purpose of this Article is to examine these recent state 
 
18 Hanna Kozlowska, Each Platform’s Approach to Political Ads in One Table, QUARTZ (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://qz.com/1767145/how-facebook-twitter-and-others-approach-political-advertising/. 
19 Scholarship about online political advertising in political communication is at least seven years old.  See, 
e.g., Lisa Barnard & Daniel Kreiss, A Research Agenda for Online Political Advertising: Surveying Campaign 
Practices, 2000–2012, 7 INT’L J. COMMC’N 2046, 2047 (2013).  Scholarship in the legal literature about online 
political advertising is much more recent.  See sources cited infra notes 64–76. 
20 S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017); see also S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019). 
21 See Note, Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1421 (2018). 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–22 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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laws as well as the one federal appellate court opinion as a springboard for thinking 
about efforts at the national level to address the problem.  We raise important 
considerations for future legislation in light of the appellate court decision. 
 This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I briefly addresses the 
landscape of political advertising regulation and the new and growing literature on 
online political advertising.  It assesses what other scholars have suggested about 
potential regulatory approaches.  Part II analyzes the eight state laws designed to 
regulate online political advertising.  Part III outlines the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit decision addressing the constitutionality of Maryland’s regulation.  
Part IV compares states’ regulatory efforts and raises a series of questions that must 
be answered if online political ad regulation is to survive First Amendment scrutiny.  
Part V concludes with a few observations about this regulatory moment in campaign 
finance law in light of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling and makes recommendations for 
future legislation. 
 
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING REGULATION  
 
Political communication scholars have spent the last decade or more studying the 
growth of digital political advertising, electioneering, and campaign and issue-group 
microtargeting online.  Legal scholars have only more recently focused on the new 
harms caused by the lack of online political advertising and electioneering oversight.24  
Scholars in both disciplines describe the landscape and nature of the problems, as well 
as the potential for expanding campaign finance regulation and/or industry self-
regulation.  An interdisciplinary approach to online political advertising will be 
critical to any regulatory effort.  We maintain that such an approach is needed to 
effectively: (1) define the scope of online political advertising; (2) identify the 
specific harms that regulation might address; and (3) propose potential solutions that 
will pass constitutional muster and actually address the harms. 
This Section proceeds as follows: First, it reviews important background material 
on federal campaign finance regulation and the nature and scope of online political 
advertising as defined by scholars.  Any new rules for online ads will have to fit within 
a complicated, and already existing, campaign finance framework.  Then, we address 
a discussion of the scholarly support for expanding campaign finance regulation to 
include online political advertising.  Legal and political communication scholars 
mostly agree that such regulation should be considered; any disagreement is mostly 








24 See sources cited infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text. 
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A.  DEFINITIONAL ISSUES, LEGAL TESTS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW  
 
The difference between protected political speech and regulated political 
advertising is one of the most difficult First Amendment needles scholars and 
regulators have attempted to thread over the last half-century.  An unregulated 
marketplace of ideas for political advertising invites corrupt actors to spend limitless 
dollars and spread lies to the electorate, but an overly regulated one threatens core 
First Amendment values protecting political speech.  Such core values encourage 
marketplace participants to debate about issues and candidates––precisely what the 
Framers had in mind.  Under that model, lies about candidates and issues are 
debunked by effective counterspeech.  The counterspeech doctrine is based on Justice 
Brandeis’ call to “expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education . . . .”25  Here, “the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”26  
Scholars and observers, however, are increasingly skeptical of the counterspeech 
doctrine’s ability to expose mis- and disinformation online.  Philip Napoli identifies 
several reasons for the diminished efficacy of counterspeech and the rise of mis- and 
disinformation, including: the death of local news; the low barriers and cheap costs 
of producing “fake news”; the rise of self-publishing, microtargeting, and echo 
chambers; and the speed and volume of online information.27  Tim Wu argues that, 
“[w]hen listeners have highly limited bandwidth to devote to any given issue, they will rarely 
dig deeply, and they are less likely to hear dissenting opinions.  In such an environment, 
[information] flooding can be just as effective as more traditional forms of censorship.”28 
Increasing discursive practices including online cancel culture,29 in which speakers 
remove their support for others in response to objectionable behaviors or opinions, 
and the heckler’s veto,30  by which speakers severely and substantially disrupt a 
speech or proceeding, also place pressure on the success of counterspeech.31  
Against this backdrop is a decades-long struggle in the U.S. to define and regulate 
political advertising at large.  This struggle largely begins with the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA”), passed in 1971, and amended in 1974.32  Together, FECA 
and its subsequent amendments created limits on campaign contributions and 
independent expenditures in an attempt to thwart corrosive influences.33   FECA 
 
25 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
26 Id. 
27 Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake 
News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 57, 69–70, 85–86 (2018). 
28  Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.  
29 What It Means to Get ‘Canceled,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-
play/cancel-culture-words-were-watching (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).  
30  Zach Greenberg, Rejecting the ‘Heckler’s Veto,’ FIRE (June 14, 2017),  
https://www.thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklers-veto/. 
31 Sanam Yar & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Tales From the Teenage Cancel Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/style/cancel-culture.html.  
32 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 
52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146). 
33 See id. 
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defines “federal election activity” to include a “public communication” (i.e., a 
broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass 
mailing, or telephone bank communication made to the general public) or “[a]ny other 
general public political advertising.” 34   Although political communication is 
generally protected by the First Amendment, the spending of money with “express 
advocacy”—the words “vote for,” “elect,” or “support”—may be limited under 
FECA.35  
Many groups, following FECA, found it easy to advocate for candidates without 
using these words.  In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) 
strengthened election law by requiring disclosures from groups that run 
“electioneering communications”—essentially closing the loophole that groups had 
discovered after FECA.36  An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable 
or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office” and is made within either, thirty days of a primary election, or sixty days of a 
general election. 37   This widened the law to exclude the express advocacy 
requirement. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of FECA in Buckley v. 
Valeo.38  While the Court upheld campaign contribution limits, it struck down limits 
on individual and interest-group expenditures, ruling that the limits would not thwart 
corruption and that spending was equivalent to speech, so the limits violated the First 
Amendment.39  Importantly for our purposes, the Court also upheld FECA’s reporting 
and disclosure requirements, which required political committees to register with the 
FEC and keep records of expenditures and contributions.40  The Court acknowledged 
that disclosure might infringe on First Amendment rights but applied an “exacting 
scrutiny” test that required the government to prove that its interest in regulating bear 
a “substantial relation” to the information disclosed.41   
In Buckley, the Court identified three compelling state interests that justify 
campaign finance disclosure requirements, including (1) the information that 
disclosure provides to voters; (2) the deterrence of corruption and the “appearance of 
corruption”; and (3) the enforcement of campaign finance laws.42  The Supreme Court 
has continuously upheld this exacting scrutiny test in subsequent cases challenging 
BCRA disclosure requirements, such as in McConnell v. FEC43 and Citizens United 
 
34 52 U.S.C. § 30101(20), (22). 
35 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52 (1976) (“This construction would restrict the application of 
[section] 608(e)(1) [of FECA] to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or 
defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ 
‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”). 
36 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), § 304, 116 Stat. 81, 89 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)). 
37 Id. § 304(f)(3). 
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. 
39 Id. at 44–49. 
40 Id. at 83. 
41 Id. at 64. 
42 Id. at 67–68. 
43 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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v. FEC.44  The broader topic of campaign finance disclosure typically encompasses 
what Abby Wood describes as two separate acts: disclosures and sponsorship 
disclaimers. 45   While disclosures often involve submitting finance reports to 
regulators, sponsorship disclaimers appear on political advertisements to identify the 
person or group who paid for the ads.46 State and federal laws vary in the terminology 
that they use to describe sponsorship disclaimers. Various laws often refer to these 
“paid for by” statements as a “disclosure”47  a “disclaimer,”48 a “statement,”49  an 
“identification requirement,”50 or an “authority line.”51 To maintain consistency with 
previous scholarship and throughout this article, we use the term “sponsorship 
disclaimer,” to describe “paid for by” statements on political ads. 
 
B.  ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING: HISTORY, DEFINITIONS, AND CALLS FOR 
REGULATION  
 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) did not include the internet as 
a form of “public communication” under federal campaign finance law,52 and it did 
not address the growth of “dark money” groups.53  Nevertheless, the FEC required 
disclaimers for “(1) unsolicited emails that political committees sen[t] to more than 
500 people[;] and (2) websites that political committees ma[d]e available to the 
public.”54  In 2004, in Shays v. FEC,55 a U.S. district court found the FEC's exclusion 
of online political communication from “public communication” impermissible.56  
Following Shays, the FEC amended the definition of “public communication” to 
include paid internet advertising on someone else's website.57  But two subsequent 
FEC administrative orders and two Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“ANPRM”) sessions in 2011 and 2016 did little to shed light on growing questions 
and concerns regarding online political advertising.  With very few comments in 
 
44 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
45 Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11, 13 (2018). 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1-3 of 2020 Special Legis. Sess.).  
48 See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 100.11; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-107.5(5), 1-45-108.3 (2019). 
49 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30120; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 127 
and J.R. No. 2).  
50 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2972(a) ) (LEXIS through Act 150 of the 2019 (Adj. Sess.) and 
Municipal Act M-11 of the 2019 (Adj. Sess.). 
51 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-401 (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020 
Regular Session of the General Assembly). 
52 Brian Beyersdorf, Note, Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: Disclosure 
Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2019). 
53 See generally Wood, supra note 45. 
54 Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1074 (citing Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,600 (Apr. 12, 
2006) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 110, 114)). 
55 Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004). 
56 Id. at 79 (“[T]he Court finds that . . . Congress intended all other forms of ‘general public political 
advertising’ to be covered by the term ‘public communication.’  What constitutes ‘general public political 
advertising’ in the world of the Internet is a matter for the FEC to determine.”). 
57 Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1075 (citing Public Communication, 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2018)). 
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either rulemaking session, the FEC did not issue a new rule, despite increasing 
concerns.58 
As Daniel Kreiss and Lisa Barnard point out, “the lines around what constitutes 
an online [political] ‘advertisement’ have continually shifted.”59  It is not surprising, 
given this legal history, that there has been “considerable confusion in the literature 
around the terminology scholars use to describe online [political] advertising.”60  
While some legal and political communication scholars have called for a broad 
definition, others have seen value in defining the “distinctive aspects of online 
advertising: the ability to narrowly target voters and track the effectiveness of ads in 
meeting strategic electoral goals.” 61   Indeed, Kreiss and Barnard define online 
political ads as “that which: (1) campaigns or other political actors produce as discrete 
components of wider strategic communications efforts[;] (2) involves systematically 
evaluating progress toward defined goals through data[;] and (3) is conducted by a 
group of specialists recognized as such by their peers.”62  They base this definition on 
the ways that practitioners themselves describe online ad practices.63 
Abby Wood and Ann Ravel, however, argue for a broader conception of online 
political advertising in the wake of problems surrounding the 2016 election.64  They 
explain that online political advertising is a “problem of native political advertising 
and that the phenomenon benefits from a lack of campaign finance transparency 
online.”65  These scholars detail the myriad of harms caused by bad actors leading up 
to the 2016 election.  They describe studies of Facebook that concluded that 86% of 
groups running paid ads in the last six week before the election were suspicious 
groups (53%), astroturf movement groups (17.1%), and questionable news outlets 
(15.8%).66  In defining online political advertising broadly, they called for regulators 
to: 
[S]ave and post every version of every political communication placed online, 
whether video, print, or image, and whether placed “for a fee” or not.  The 
communications should be placed on a dedicated and easy-to-locate page on the 
campaign's or group's website or user page on the platform, as well as on a dedicated 
page created by the platform.  The communications should be stored in their entirety, 
and they should be posted along with a uniform set of data stored in a uniform format 
for easy analysis and comparison across campaigns, across platforms, and over time.  
The FEC should also retain this data, for longer term storage, and to ensure that it 
exists even when platforms change or cease to operate.  In addition to the 
communication itself, the online political advertising repository should contain the 
 
58 Id. at 1080–81. 
59 Barnard & Kreiss, supra note 19, at 2047. 
60 Id. at 2048. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64  Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online 
Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2018). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1230. 
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following data: when the communications ran; how much they cost to place and 
promote; candidates to which the communications refer; contested seat/issues 
mentioned; targeting criteria used; number of people targeted; and a platform-
provided Audience [sic] identifier (“Audience ID”).67 
Wood and Ravel did not address either the practical or questionable legal 
feasibility of their idea, but such a proposal would require significant monitoring and 
oversight.  The platforms themselves, as previously mentioned, have begun some of 
this monitoring on their own.  Beyond the platforms, it is not clear how and who 
would be responsible for collecting such data, although the authors do propose that 
the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network would be a better fit than 
the FEC.68  Other scholars have similarly detailed the incompetency of the FEC in 
recent years and called for a major overhaul of that administrative body.69   
Wood and Ravel are joined by a few other legal commentators in their call for 
new regulation.  Millicent Usoro argued that despite anti-regulatory First Amendment 
jurisprudence in recent years, the First Amendment is not an automatic shield against 
regulation of a new medium.70  She argued that throughout history, the Court has 
extended new rules to new media, particularly to protect national security and 
electoral interests.71  Irina Dykhne argued that online political ads should always have 
links to sponsorship disclaimers or “rollovers”72—and that advertisers should be 
allowed to propose other technological ways to disclaim.73  Additionally, Dykhne 
argued that ads containing 200 characters or more should be considered online ads 
and should not be eligible for FEC rules excluding small and impracticable items from 
disclaimer requirements.74 
Brian Beyersdorf wrote that platform self-policing will not be enough and 
supports the Honest Ads Act (“HHA”), which expands the definition of “public 
communication,” requires disclaimers and records for online ads, and prohibits 
foreign meddling.75  Pichaya Winichakul wrote that the problem of online political 
advertising is primarily structural.  She criticized the FEC for failing to: 
[I]nitiate an enforcement action against the [Russian] Internet Research Agency 
for not disclosing $100,000 spent on digital advertisements that did not carry a 
disclaimer, activities that existing FEC rules currently reach.  Nor does the [HHA] 
address the FEC's nonenforcement of a provision well within the FEC's powers that 
prohibits the involvement of non-U.S. citizens in electoral activities.  In other words, 
 
67 Id. at 1256. 
68 Id. at 1275. 
69 Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, supra note 21; see also 
Pichaya P. Winichakul, Note, The Missing Structural Debate: Reforming Disclosure of Online Political 
Communications, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1387 (2018). 
70 Millicent Usoro, Note, A Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis on Controlled Campaign Finance 
Disclosure on the Internet, 71 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 299 (2019). 
71 Id. at 320–23. 
72 A “rollover” disclaimer is a disclaimer statement that appears for a set period of time when a user holds 
their computer cursor over the advertisement. See Irina Dykhne, Note, Persuasive or Deceptive? Native 
Advertising in Political Campaigns, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 371 (2018). 
73 Dykhne, supra note 72, at 370–71. 
74 Id. at 370. 
75 Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1090. 
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it is already within the FEC's power to require the Internet Research Agency to 
disclose information about its funding sources and to punish the Internet Research 
Agency for failing to disclose.76 
While scholars and federal regulators disagree about responsibility and solutions, 
states have not waited to regulate. 77   Eight states now have statutes addressing 
sponsorship disclaimer and record-keeping requirements for online political 
advertising.78  In a recent Fourth Circuit decision, one state’s law has already been 
declared unconstitutional as applied to specific plaintiffs.79 
 
II. STATE EFFORTS TO REGULATE ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING  
 
 Between the 2016 presidential election and early 2020, several states enacted 
new legislation or amended existing legislation on political advertising to regulate 
online political advertising for state candidates and ballot measures. 80   These 
legislative efforts primarily fall into two categories: (1) state laws that establish only 
sponsorship disclaimer requirements; and (2) state laws that establish both disclaimer 
requirements and additional record-keeping requirements that often include 
maintaining digital archives.81 
 
A.  STATES THAT ONLY HAVE SPONSORSHIP DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS  
 
1.  Colorado  
 
 In 2019, the Colorado General Assembly amended existing campaign 
finance legislation to include sponsorship disclaimers for “electioneering 
communications” 82  and “independent expenditures” 83  that appear on a “website, 
 
76 Winichakul, supra note 69, at 1396 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
77 Kelly Born, How States Are Experimenting with Digital Political Advertising Regulation: Interview with 
Campaign Legal Center’s Erin Chlopak, HEWLETT FOUND. (May 28, 2019), https://hewlett.org/how-states-are-
experimenting-with-digital-political-advertising-regulation-interview-with-campaign-legal-centers-erin-
chlopak/. 
78 See infra Part II. 
79 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2019). 
80 Born, supra note 77. 
81 Id.  
82 Colorado law defines an “electioneering communication” as: 
Any communication broadcasted by television or radio, printed in a newspaper or 
on a billboard, directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences or otherwise 
distributed that: (I) [u]nambiguously refers to a candidate; (II) [i]s broadcasted, printed, 
mailed, delivered, or distributed within thirty days before a primary election or sixty days 
before a general election; and (III) [i]s broadcasted to, printed in a newspaper distributed 
to, mailed to, delivered by hand to, or otherwise distributed to an audience that includes 
members of the electorate for such public office. 
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a). 
83 Colorado law defines an “independent expenditure” as “an expenditure that is not controlled by or 
coordinated with any candidate or agent of such candidate.”  Id. § 2(9).  
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streaming media service, or online forum.” 84   These disclaimers must state the 
purchaser’s name or the name of the purchaser’s “registered agent” (if the purchaser 
is not a “natural person”), using the language “paid for by.”85  The statute provides an 
exception for when these disclaimers are not practical, stating that rules promulgated 
by the Secretary of State must require a hyperlink to a webpage containing the 




 Vermont’s sponsorship disclaimer requirements for online political 
advertising apply to “electioneering communication[s].”87  In May 2018, the Vermont 
General Assembly amended its existing political advertising laws to specifically 
include “mass electronic or digital communications” within the broader definition of 
“electioneering communication.” 88   Electioneering communications disseminated 
online must clearly state the name and, for all non-audio ads, the address of the 
candidate, person, or group that paid for the ads or the candidate, person, or group on 
whose behalf they were purchased.89  Ads purchased by or on behalf of a political 
committee or political party must also list on the ad the names of donors who have 
contributed more than $2,000 or 25% of the group’s total donations since the start of 
the current two-year election cycle.90   Vermont includes one exception to these 
requirements: if following the disclaimer requirements would be impractical, the 
communication can instead hyperlink to a separate page containing the disclaimers.91  
 
3. Wyoming  
 
 Wyoming’s online political advertising regulations only include sponsorship 
disclaimer requirements.92  In 2019, the Wyoming State Legislature amended the 
forms of political advertising that require disclaimers to include internet and 
electronic communications.93  Political advertising distributed online and paid for by 
a candidate, candidate campaign committee, political action committee (“PAC”), 
political party committee, or other organization that makes electioneering 
communications or independent expenditures must state the name of the purchaser.94  
Wyoming also provides an exception for when incorporating disclaimers may be 
 
84 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-107.5(5), 1-45-108.3 (2019). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2972(a). Vermont law defines an “electioneering communication” as “any 
communication [including digital communications] that refers to a clearly identified candidate for public office 
and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office, 
regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate.”  Id. § 2901(6). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. § 2972(a)–(b). 
90 Id. § 2972(c)(1). 
91 Id. § 2972(d). 
92 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. § 22-25-110(a). 
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unworkable because of the advertisement’s size or text restrictions by stating that the 
disclaimer may instead be given via a hyperlink to a separate webpage.95 
 
B. STATES WITH BOTH SPONSORSHIP DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS AND 




 California updated its laws on online political advertising in October 2019.96  
California regulates online political ads under a somewhat complex statutory scheme 
and discusses advertising using the terms “electronic media advertisements” and 
“online platform disclosed advertisements.”97  Although California does not seem to 
define “electronic media advertisement,” the state defines an “online platform 
disclosed advertisement” as either (1) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement on an 
online platform” that allows for user-generated content, “unless all advertisements on 
the platform are video advertisements that can comply” with the sponsorship 
disclaimer requirements for videos; or (2) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement 
on an online platform that is not . . . [a] graphic, image, animated graphic, or animated 
image” that can link to a separate website containing the required disclaimer or a 
“[v]ideo, audio, or email.”98  Disclaimer requirements for online political advertising 
in California vary slightly based on who paid for the ad, whether the ad discusses a 
candidate or a ballot measure, and the medium of the ad.99  Although the statutory 
language of California’s political advertising laws is fairly complex, the California 
Fair Political Practices Commission provides numerous compliance resources for 
parties purchasing political ads, including online political ads that are not “online 
platform disclosed advertisements.”100  
 First, candidate committees are not required to include disclaimers on all 
electronic media advertisements they disseminate for that candidate’s own election.101  
However, the California Fair Political Practices Commission recommends that 
candidate committees state the committee’s name and committee ID number and 
notes that a “paid for by” disclaimer is required for paid social media ads.102 
 
95 Id. § 22-25-110(a)(iv). 
96 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 558 (A.B. 864) (West) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84305, 84501–
84503, 84504.2–84504.6, 84511, 85704 (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)). 
97 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a). 
98 Id. § 84504.6(a)(2)(A). 
99 Id. § 84504.3. 
100  Campaign Advertising - Requirements & Restrictions, CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/learn/campaign-rules/campaign-advertising-requirements-restrictions.html (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2020). 
101  CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: COMMUNICATIONS BY 
CANDIDATE COMMITTEES FOR THEIR OWN ELECTION (2020), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_1_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf. 
102 Id. at 3. 
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Committees other than candidate or political party committees that purchase non-
video electronic media ads with graphic elements or animation must state the name 
of the committee and link to a separate webpage that states the committee’s top donors 
and is available for thirty days after the election.103  Disclaimers for independent 
expenditures that support or oppose a candidate must include a statement indicating 
that no candidate or candidate committee authorized the ad.104 
 Candidate and political party committees that purchase non-video electronic 
media ads with graphic elements or animation and support or oppose a ballot measure 
must state the committee’s name. 105   If the ad also qualifies as an independent 
expenditure, it must link to a separate webpage that includes the committee’s name.106  
This page must be available for thirty days after the election.107   If the ad was 
purchased by an independent expenditure supports or opposes a candidate, it must 
include a statement indicating that no candidate or candidate committee authorized 
the ad.108 
 Those purchasing audio and video electronic media ads are directed to follow 
separate, but analogous, disclaimer requirements in place for all audio and video 
ads.109  Audio ads purchased by a candidate committee or political party committee 
must state the name of the committee. 110   Committees, other than candidate 
 
103 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84503, 84504.3(a)(1)–(b), 84504.3(e); see also CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, 
POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: ALL NON-INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE ADS (EXCEPT ADS BY 
CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES) (2020), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_6_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf; CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURE: INDEPENDENT 
EXPENDITURE ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES (EXCEPT ADS BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY 
COMMITTEES) (2020), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_3_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf; CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: INDEPENDENT 




104 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.3(a)–(b), 84506.5.  
105  Id. § 84504.3(a)(2)–(b); see also CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING 
DISCLOSURES: ALL NON-INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE ADS BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY 
COMMITTEES (2020), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_7_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf; CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: INDEPENDENT 
EXPENDITURE ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES (2020), 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_4_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf [hereinafter ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES]; 
CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE ADS 




106  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.3(b)(2); see also ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES BY CANDIDATES AND 
POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES, supra note 105. 
107 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.3(e).  
108 Id. §§ 84504.3(a)(2)(A)–(b)(2), 84506.5. 
109 Id. § 84504.3(f)–(g). 
110 Id. §§ 84502(a)(2), 84504(a), 84504.3(f). 
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committees and political party committees, who purchase audio electronic media ads 
must follow these same requirements, in addition to stating the committee’s top 
contributors.111  If the ad is also an independent expenditure supporting a candidate, 
it must state that a candidate or candidate committee did not authorize the ad.112  The 
disclaimers required for video electronic media ads are largely the same as those 
required for audio ads.113 
 California imposes separate requirements for platforms hosting “online 
platform disclosed advertisements.” 114   In California, platforms subject to these 
requirements include any “public-facing internet website, web application, or digital 
application . . . that sells advertisements directly to advertisers” unless the website or 
application “displays advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers through 
another online platform.”115  First, platforms are required to either place a disclaimer 
next to the ad with the name of the committee that paid for it or link to a webpage 
with the committee’s name using a separate button.116  Second, when a committee has 
spent more than $500 on ad space from that platform in the past year, the platform is 
required to keep publicly accessible records about ads from that committee.117  These 
records must include copies of the ad, the number of impressions the ad received, the 
date and time the ad was first displayed, the date and time the ad was last displayed, 
the cost of the ad, the candidate or ballot measure that is the subject of the ad, and the 
name and ID number of the purchasing committee.118  These records must be kept by 
the platform for four years.119 
 
 2. New Jersey  
 
 The New Jersey Legislature amended the state’s political advertising laws in 
2019 to apply to “internet and digital” political advertising purchased by any person 
or group.120  Under the law, internet and digital ads (1) “promoting the nomination, 
election or defeat of any candidate or providing political information on any 
candidate”; (2) promoting “the passage or defeat of any public question or providing 
political information on any public question”; or (3) promoting “the passage or defeat 
of legislation or regulation in the case of an independent expenditure committee” must 
state the name and address of the ad’s purchaser.121  Additionally, ads that are not 
 
111 Id. §§ 84503(a), 84504, 84504.3(f). 
112 Id. §§ 84504(a)–(b), 84506.5. 
113 See id. §§ 84502(a)(1)–(2), 84503(a), 84504.1(a)–(c), 84504.5. 
114 Id. § 84504.6. 
115 Id. § 84504.6(a)(1). 
116 Id. § 84504.6(c). 
117 Id. § 84504.6(d)(1). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. § 84504.6(d)(2). 
120 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-22.3(a)–(b), 19:44A-22.3(e). 
121 Id. § 19:44A-22.3(a)–(b). 
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made in coordination with a candidate or someone acting on a candidate’s behalf must 
state that independent status on the ad itself.122 
 In New Jersey, parties that are paid to disseminate political advertising must 
keep a copy of the ad and the name and address of the ad’s purchaser, as well as either 
“the number of copies made or the dates and times” the ad was distributed.123  These 
records must be publicly available for two years, but there is no requirement that these 
records be made available online.124 
 
3. New York 
 
 In 2018, New York enacted the Democracy Protection Act to incorporate 
online political advertising into the state’s definition of regulated political 
communication. 125   The New York State Assembly further amended the law in 
November 2019, and these amended requirements became effective starting in 
January 2020.126  Under the amended law, digital political communications purchased 
by a political committee must state that the ad was “paid for by” that committee.127  
New York’s sponsorship disclaimer requirement also includes an exception128:  If the 
ad is too small to include the disclaimer, the required information may be provided 
by a hyperlink to a separate webpage.129  In addition to stating the name of the ad’s 
purchaser using the “paid for by” language, internet and digital advertisements that 
also qualify as an independent expenditure must state that the ad was not “expressly 
authorized or requested” by a candidate.130  
 Although New York imposes record-keeping requirements for online 
political advertisements made by independent expenditure committees, New York is 
unique in that the responsibility for maintaining publicly accessible databases falls to 
the New York State Board of Elections rather than online platforms disseminating 
political ads.131  In this database, the Board maintains copies of the ad, scripts of any 
audio or video elements, descriptions of any visual elements, screenshots of ads 
without audio or video elements, and individual images for ads with animated 




122 Id. § 19:44A-22.3(b)–(c). 
123 Id. § 19:44A-22.3(d). 
124 Id. 
125 N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 14-106, 14-107 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 
to 347). 
126 2019 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 454 (A. 4668) (codified at N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 14-106, 14-107, 14-126 
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 to 347)). 
127 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-106(2). 
128 Id. § 14-106(4). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. § 14-107(2). 
131 Id. § 14-107(5-a). 
132 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6200.11(c) (Westlaw through amendments included in the New 
York State Register, Volume XXLII, Issue 52 dated December 30, 2020). 
133 ELEC. § 14-107(5-a). 
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 4. Washington  
 
 Washington amended its laws regulating political advertising in 2018.134  The 
laws apply to three categories of advertising: political advertising,135 electioneering 
communications, 136  and independent expenditures. 137   Each of these categories 
includes digital communications.138  Online political advertisements must state the 
purchaser’s name and address.139  If political advertising or a series of political ads is 
paid for by a committee, supports or opposes a ballot measure, and costs $1,000 or 
more, the ad must also state the committee’s top five contributors and, if a top 
contributor is a separate PAC, the top three contributors to that PAC.140  Additionally, 
if a candidate in a partisan election associates himself with a political party in a 
declaration of candidacy, that party designation must also be included in the 
disclaimer.141   
 Online political ads that also qualify as electioneering communications or 
independent expenditures and are purchased by someone other than a political party 
are required to make additional disclaimers.142  First, these ads must state that “[n]o 
candidate authorized this ad” and include the address of the purchaser in addition to 
the purchaser’s name.143  If the ad was paid for by a political committee, it must also 
state the person or entity that established, controls, or maintains the committee as well 
as the committee’s top five contributors and top three donors to PAC contributors, no 
matter the cost of the advertising.144   
 Washington requires “commercial advertiser[s]” that place ads to maintain 
publicly accessible records about those ads and to provide records related to the ads 
to the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission upon request.145  The state 
 
134 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.005 (2019) (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020 Regular 
Session of the Washington Legislature). 
135 Washington defines “political advertising” as “any advertising displays [including digital] used for the 
purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial or other support or opposition in any 
election campaign.”  Id. § 42.17A.005(40). 
136  Washington defines “electioneering communication” as including any digital communication that 
“clearly identifies a candidate for a state, local, or judicial office,” is distributed “within sixty days before any 
election for that office in the jurisdiction in which the candidate is seeking election,” and “has a fair market 
value or cost of one thousand dollars or more.”  Id. § 42.17A.005(21). 
137 Washington defines “independent expenditure” as including political advertising “made in support or 
opposition to a candidate for office by a person who is not [a] candidate for that office, [a]n authorized committee 
of that candidate for that office, [or] [a] person who has received the candidate’s encouragement or approval to 
make the expenditure.”  Id. § 42.17A.005(30)(i).  The expenditure must also be made without collaboration with 
the candidate it supports or opposes, specifically name the candidate or otherwise clearly identify them, and 
either alone or combined with other expenditures purchased by the same person, cost $1,000 or more.  Id. § 
42.17A.005(30)(ii)–(iv). 
138 Id. §§ 42.17A.005(21), 42.17A.005(29), 42.17A.005(40). 
139 Id. § 42.17A.320(1). 
140 Id. §§ 41.17A.320(6), 42.17A.350. 
141 Id. § 41.17A.320(1). 
142 Id. § 41.17A.320(2). 
143 Id. § 41.17A.320(2)(a). 
144 Id. §§ 41.17A.320(2)(b)–(c); 42.17A.350(1)–(2). 
145 Id. § 41.17A.345(1)–(2). 
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broadly defines “commercial advertiser” as “any person that sells the service of 
communicating messages.”146  The records must include the names and addresses of 
ad purchasers, the “exact nature and extent of the services” provided to ad purchasers 
by the platform, and the cost of the platform’s services.147  However, there is no 




 In 2018, the Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act 
amended Maryland’s existing political advertising laws to include “qualifying paid 
digital communication[s]” 149  within the definition of regulated “campaign 
material[s].”150  Maryland requires qualifying paid digital communications that are 
distributed by a “campaign finance entity” to state the name and address of the entity’s 
treasurer and all entities for which that person is serving as treasurer.151  Other parties 
that pay for qualifying political ads must state that party’s name and address.152  
However, under both of these scenarios, ads may omit addresses that are already filed 
with the State or a local board of elections.153  Qualifying paid digital communications 
that are not authorized by a candidate must also state that fact.154 
 Maryland law also imposes record-keeping requirements on platforms who 
disseminate qualifying paid digital communications.155  Under the law, platforms are 
required to maintain publicly accessible, online databases containing different 
information about the ads depending on who purchased them.156  For ads bought by a 
political committee, platforms must record the purchaser’s name and contact 
information, the committee’s treasurer, and the amount paid.157  For ads bought by an 
ad network, platforms must record the network’s contact information and include a 
hyperlink to the contact page of the network’s website.158  For ads bought by someone 
other than a political committee or an ad network, platforms must record the 
purchaser’s name and contact information, the amount paid, and the name of anyone 
 
146 Id. § 42.17A.005(10). 
147 Id. § 41.17A.345(1). 
148 Id. § 41.17A.345. 
149 Maryland defines “qualifying paid digital communication” as “any electronic communication that: (1) 
is campaign material; (2) is placed or promoted for a fee on an online platform; (3) is disseminated to 500 or 
more individuals; and (4) does not propose a commercial transaction.”  MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 1-101(ll-
1) (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020 Regular Session of the General Assembly). 
150 Id. § 13-405.  Maryland defines “campaign material” as “any material [including qualifying paid digital 
communications] that (i) contains text, graphics, or other images; (ii) relates to a candidate, a prospective 
candidate, or the approval or rejection of a question or a prospective question; and (iii) is published, distributed, 
or disseminated.”  Id. § 1-101(k)(1)–(2). 
151 Id. § 13-401(a)(1)(i).  
152 Id. § 13-401(a)(1)(ii). 
153 Id. § 13-401(a)(2). 
154 Id. § 13-401(b). 
155 Id. § 13-405(b). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. § 13-405(b)(6)(i). 
158 Id. § 13-405(b)(6)(iii). 
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that controls the purchaser, like a CEO.159  These records should be collected within 
forty-eight hours of the ad’s purchase and kept for one year following the next general 
election.160  If the ad has not yet been paid for, platforms can request a waiver from 
the Maryland State Board of Elections to expand the two-day collection period to 
seven days.161  However, platforms seeking a waiver must explain why compliance 
would present an “unreasonable burden” and note how the platform will comply in 
the future.162  Platforms cannot apply for more than one waiver or apply for a waiver 
within thirty days of an election.163   
 In addition to these record-keeping requirements, platforms disseminating 
qualifying paid digital communications are required to provide the State Board of 
Elections with information about the candidate or ballot issue discussed in the ad, 
whether the ad “support[ed] or oppos[ed] that candidate or ballot issue,” the first date 
and time the ad was distributed, the last date and time the ad was distributed, a copy 
of the ad, the geographic location and audience targeted, and the number of times the 
ad was viewed.164   Similar to platforms’ other record-keeping requirements, this 
information should be available to the State Board within forty-eight hours of when 
the ad is distributed and kept by the platform for one year following the next general 
election.165   
 What qualifies as a platform subject to the law’s record-keeping 
requirements is broad.  Under the Act, a “platform” is a “public-facing website, web 
application, or digital application, including a social network, ad network, or search 
engine, that (1) has 100,000 or more unique monthly United States visitors or users 
for a majority of months during the [past year]; and (2) receives payment for 
qualifying paid digital communications.”166  In December 2019, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that Maryland’s requirements for platforms that disseminate online 
political advertising were unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs.167   
 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO MARYLAND’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS  
 
 In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled 
that the responsibilities Maryland’s online political advertising law imposed on online 
platforms were unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs, including 
the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun, among others.168  Although the Fourth 
Circuit determined that Maryland had significant interests in preventing foreign 
election interference, encouraging an informed public, and discouraging corruption, 
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the law’s requirements for online platforms were not sufficiently tailored to pass 
either strict or exacting constitutional scrutiny.169   
 The Fourth Circuit characterized the law’s requirements for online platforms 
as falling into two separate categories.170   First, the law imposed a “publication 
requirement” that obligated plaintiffs to create and maintain publicly accessible 
online databases with information about the ads that they run on their platforms.171  
Second, the law imposed an “inspection requirement” that obligated plaintiffs to make 
records of ad purchasers available to the Maryland Board of Elections. 172   The 
Maryland Attorney General can seek injunctive relief to have the ad pulled from the 
platform if the platform does not follow either of these provisions.173  Platforms may 
also face criminal penalties, including a $250 fine or up to thirty days in prison, for 
failing to comply with an injunction that orders an ad’s removal.174   
 According to the Fourth Circuit, the two provisions implicated the First 
Amendment’s protection against compelled speech.175  The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that both the publication and inspection requirements compelled political speech for 
two reasons.176  First, by requiring the plaintiffs to make certain information available 
to the public and to state regulators, the provisions “forc[ed] elements of civil society 
to speak when they otherwise would have refrained,” thereby contradicting the long-
standing First Amendment tradition that “freedom of speech ‘includ[ed] both the right 
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’”177  Second, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that these provisions implicated the plainitffs’ First Amendment 
right against compelled speech, which, for these particular media plaintiffs, also 
implicated the right to anonymous speech by compelling these plaintiffs to identify 
an ad purchaser.178  Overall, the court concluded that both provisions “pose[] a real 
risk of either chilling speech or manipulating the marketplace of ideas.”179 
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld disclosure requirements placed 
on the ad purchasers themselves, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s 
requirements for platforms were fundamentally different because they burdened the 
speech of third parties rather than political actors that are “direct participants in the 
political process.”180   Specifically, requirements placed directly on ad purchasers 
burden speech without preventing speech entirely because direct purchasers are 
incentivized to keep advertising as a tool for reaching voters in an election.181  In 
contrast, online platforms, like the plaintiffs here, do not have that same incentive, 
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and, as a result, the burdens imposed by these requirements could lead platforms to 
simply not accept political advertising for Maryland candidates and ballot 
measures.182  According to the court, this self-censorship results because Maryland’s 
requirements place a financial burden on platforms: They could make a higher profit 
selling other types of advertising that do not require record-keeping, and the 
requirements open platforms up to legal liability. 183   Consequently, political 
advertising may be shut out of the online marketplace of ideas, which could hurt 
candidates seeking election.184  For instance, one candidate for Maryland’s House of 
Delegates noted that his campaign was hindered by Google’s policy of not accepting 
political advertising for Maryland candidates and ballot measures.185 
The Fourth Circuit also explained that by compelling disclosure of this 
information about ads and ad purchasers through the publication requirement, the law 
“‘intru[des] into the function of editors and forces news publishers to speak in a way 
they would not otherwise.”186   Additionally, the court found that the inspection 
requirement compelling plaintiffs to make this information available to the state 
government created an “unhealthy entanglement” between the state and news 
organizations.187  Thus, in the court’s view, the inspection requirement “lack[ed] any 
readily discernable limits on the ability of government to supervise the operations of 
the newsroom.”188  The Fourth Circuit rejected Maryland’s argument that plaintiffs 
may simply “opt-out” of the obligations imposed by the provisions by refusing to 
accept regulated advertisements, stating “when a private entity, let alone a newspaper, 
decides to host political speech, its First Amendment protections are at their apex.  To 
contend that news outlets forgo some of their free speech rights by accepting political 
speech turns the First Amendment on its head.”189   
The parties disagreed over whether the law should be subject to strict or exacting 
scrutiny, and the Fourth Circuit declined to reach a conclusion on that point.190  While 
strict scrutiny requires a law to be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling” 
government interest,191 the slightly lower standard of exacting scrutiny requires that 
compelled disclosures have a “‘substantial relation’ between the governmental 
interest and the information required to be disclosed.”192  Although the Fourth Circuit 
did not determine whether strict or exacting scrutiny applied here, the court concluded 
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that the law was insufficiently tailored to meet the lower standard of exacting scrutiny 
for two reasons.193  First, Maryland failed to show that foreign election interference 
occurred on news sites like those operated by the plaintiffs.194  Second, Maryland 
similarly failed to recognize that different-sized platforms had varying levels of 
vulnerability to foreign election interference, and the court specifically noted that 
while platforms like Facebook were more susceptible to interference, there was 
insufficient evidence to show that large platforms like Facebook and smaller 
platforms operated by the plaintiffs needed the same level of regulatory oversight.195  
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit was clear in limiting its holding to the specific facts 
and plaintiffs of this case. 196   However, the decision raises numerous questions 
regarding how states should craft and justify legislation seeking to regulate online 
political advertising.   
 
IV.  ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCLOSURE 
AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
 Currently, political advertising that occurs online is often described as “the 
political equivalent of the Wild West without sheriffs.” 197   Although candidates 
regularly use online media to distribute political advertising, numerous loopholes 
exist in federal law that allow online political advertising to go unregulated.198  In 
response to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the proposed 
Honest Ads Act seeks to close this regulatory gap at the federal level by expanding 
the scope of political ads that require disclaimers to include online political ads.199  
The bill also requires that platforms hosting online political ads maintain publicly 
accessible databases containing records of the ads and their purchasers when an ad 
purchaser spends more than $500 on ad space during the calendar year.200  Despite 
being introduced in the U.S. Senate twice in the past three years, no action has been 
taken on the proposed legislation.201   
 While federal legislative action remains at a stalemate, several states have 
taken action since the 2016 presidential elections to increase disclosure and 
transparency in online political advertising for state candidates and ballot measures.202  
Although each state defines the types of political advertising that are covered slightly 
differently, in general these state statutes include either disclaimer requirements, or 
both disclaimer requirements and additional record-keeping requirements that 
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typically fall on the platform hosting the ads.203  Of the eight states that have directly 
addressed online political advertising, five have established both disclaimer and 
record-keeping requirements, with Colorado, Vermont, and Wyoming opting to only 
implement disclaimer requirements.204  These state laws are designed to increase 
transparency surrounding online political advertising, and, although the state laws are 
quite similar, the nuanced differences among them, along with the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in McManus, highlight unanswered questions about what that transparency 
should look like and who is responsible for creating it. 
 The disclaimer requirements for online political ads are fairly similar across 
all eight states, and, generally, they require that the ad state the name and, sometimes, 
address of the ad’s purchaser.205  This largely fits within our traditional conception of 
what political advertising sponsorship disclaimers look like, and, in many cases, 
applying these disclaimer requirements to online political advertising was a simple 
matter of state legislatures extending the requirements that were already in place for 
other types of political ads.206  In some cases, these requirements go beyond what is 
typically required for political advertising on traditional media at the federal level.  
For example, federal law requires political ads to clearly state the ad’s purchaser and, 
if applicable, indicate that the ad was not authorized by a candidate.207  Here, some of 
these state laws require that online political advertising purchased by certain political 
committees also list the purchasing committee’s top contributors.208 
 Additionally, five states established record-keeping requirements for online 
political ads in addition to the disclaimer requirements.209  In each state, the laws 
establish some form of publicly accessible record-containing information about 
online political ads and their purchasers.210  These records often include the types of 
information various scholars contend should be maintained to increase transparency 
of political ads online.  For instance, Wood and Ravel called for the FEC to maintain 
data on a number of different points, including “when the communications ran; how 
much they cost to place and promote; candidates to which the communications refer; 
[and] contested seat/issues mentioned.” 211   California, New Jersey, Washington, 
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Maryland, and New York all require that at least some of these data points be 
maintained in public records.212 
 Although these five states have each created record-keeping requirements, 
they differ in where they place the responsibility for maintaining those records.  In 
California, Maryland, New Jersey, and Washington, the online platforms that host the 
advertisements are required to maintain these records.213  In Maryland specifically, 
online platforms must make these records publicly available online.214  In that regard, 
Maryland’s statutory scheme is very similar to that of the proposed Honest Ads Act, 
which also calls for platforms to maintain public databases on online political ads.215  
In contrast to these four states and the federal proposal, in New York, the state 
government has the responsibility of maintaining these records.216 
 States that place this record-keeping responsibility on platforms hosting 
political ads define who qualifies as a platform quite broadly.  For instance, Maryland 
defines an “online platform” as a website or application that sells advertising space 
and has at least 100,000 monthly users for most of the past year.217  In Washington, 
California, and New Jersey, what qualifies as a platform is seemingly even broader.  
Washington places this requirement on all “commercial advertisers,” a term that is 
defined as “any person that sells the service of communicating messages,” including 
online advertisements.218  Similarly, California defines an “online platform” as any 
“public-facing internet website, web application, or digital application . . . that sells 
advertisements directly to advertisers,” unless that website or application “displays 
advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers through another online 
platform.”219  New Jersey simply states that “any person who accepts compensation” 
for disseminating political advertising must keep records of the transaction and the ad 
itself.220  While the proposed Honest Ads Act places a $500 threshold on purchased 
ad space before the record-keeping requirements placed on platforms take effect, only 
one state, California, expressly provides a similar dollar threshold.221 
 Overall, these record-keeping requirements are generally consistent with the 
goals of traditional campaign finance regulations because they increase transparency 
and better allow voters to evaluate the information they receive through these ads.222  
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated campaign finance regulations that seek 
to prohibit certain types of speech, the Court has consistently upheld disclosure 
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requirements for political ads.223   For example, in McConnell v. FEC, the Court 
agreed with the district court’s determination that the “argument for striking down 
[the] disclosure provision does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values 
that Plaintiffs argue are trampled [by the provision], but ignores the competing First 
Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the 
political marketplace.”224  Likewise, while the Court in Citizens United v. FEC struck 
down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s ban on independent expenditures for 
express advocacy and electioneering communications financed by corporate treasury 
funds, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements, finding that while “[d]isclaimer 
and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, . . . they . . . ‘do not 
prevent anyone from speaking.’”225 
 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court noted three main government 
interests in compelled disclosures.226  First, disclosures allow the electorate to better 
evaluate candidates for elected office because by knowing the source of campaign 
funding, voters can learn about a candidate’s interests and “place each candidate in 
the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party 
labels and campaign speeches.”227  Second, disclosures prevent both corruption and 
the “appearance of corruption.”228  Third, disclosure and record-keeping requirements 
can be used to detect violations of contribution limits.229  In addition to these interests 
in instituting disclosure requirements, courts have more generally concluded that the 
government has a compelling interest in “[p]reserving fair and honest elections and 
preventing foreign influence.”230  
 The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in McManus suggests that the 
traditionally asserted state interests that have historically justified disclosure 
requirements imposed on ad purchasers may be insufficient to justify those 
requirements for third parties that host political ads, absent some additional evidence 
of a clear problem or harm to electoral integrity.231  In McManus, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that Maryland’s interests in deterring foreign interference in state 
elections, providing voters with information to make informed decisions, preventing 
corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance laws were all “sufficiently 
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important” to justify traditional campaign finance regulations.232  However, the court 
determined that imposing these requirements on third-party platforms was more 
problematic than imposing disclosure requirements on ad purchasers themselves, and, 
for these plaintiffs specifically, the law was not narrowly tailored to further 
Maryland’s interests.233  Specifically, Maryland failed to produce sufficient evidence 
to show that the specific platforms operated by the plaintiffs were used to facilitate 
foreign interference in Maryland elections.234  Additionally the Fourth Circuit noted 
how the platforms operated by the plaintiffs here stood in contrast to platforms like 
Facebook, where there was evidence of interference, and Maryland failed to justify 
why both sets of platforms required the same regulation.235  Accordingly, the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion suggests that in order to impose record-keeping requirements 
broadly on a wide range of platforms that host online political advertising, states 
should have some concrete evidence, more than speculation, of an electoral harm 
present in political advertising on that specific platform, and that regulating that 
platform would address that harm.  
 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit explained how placing Maryland’s record-
keeping responsibility on these specific plaintiffs as news organizations is particularly 
problematic.236  According to the court, Maryland’s law “‘intrud[es] into the function 
of editors’ and forces news publishers to speak in a way they would not otherwise.”237  
Here, the Fourth Circuit rejected Maryland’s argument that the responsibility for 
transparency in online political advertising partially rests on the platforms that 
disseminate it just as similar responsibilities exist for broadcast stations who must 
keep and give records to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) for 
public disclosure in the political files.238  Instead, the Fourth Circuit noted that the 
rationale of spectrum scarcity, which justifies regulating broadcast stations, simply 
does not apply to the internet. 239   Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
seemingly sets the stage for a scenario in which broadcast news stations have an 
obligation of disclosure while, despite the increasing use of online political 
advertising, media organizations that operate online do not have that same 
responsibility.  As a result, news organizations that operate online may have a 
competitive advantage over their broadcasting counterparts who face potential legal 
liability for failing to comply with disclosure regulations. 
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 Finally, despite its sweeping language, the McManus case is narrow in that 
it deals only with an as-applied challenge brought by a group of media 
organizations.240  Ultimately, given the unique position of the plaintiffs in this case, it 
is currently unclear how far this opinion will extend, if at all, to online political 
advertising laws that target large platforms like Facebook.  Nonetheless, McManus 
suggests that governments will likely be unable to take a wide-approach by imposing 
record-keeping requirements on all or nearly all third parties that distribute online 




The Mueller report, which was produced after an investigation into foreign 
interference in the 2016 presidential election, and more recent reports about the 
growth of online political advertising have set the stage for ongoing debate about who 
should regulate the online political ad market, as well as what regulatory parameters 
would survive constitutional scrutiny.  With movement on the federal Honest Ads Act 
stalled in Congress, we assessed the efforts of eight states to regulate online political 
advertising for state races and one federal appellate court case.  Overall, these state 
efforts fall within two categories: states that have implemented only disclaimer 
requirements for online political advertising and states that have implemented both 
disclaimer requirements and some form of record-keeping requirement that is often 
placed on the platforms hosting the ads.  However, the Fourth Circuit’s recent 
decision on Maryland’s requirements for online platforms hosting political ads raises 
numerous unanswered questions regarding the constitutionality of these laws and 
whether the traditionally asserted justifications for campaign finance regulations will 
extend to justify record-keeping requirements on third party platforms. 
Scholars have demonstrated that the platforms themselves have not consistently 
and transparently maintained policies about online political advertising, much less a 
clear database, so state and federal regulation in this area appears inevitable.241  That 
said, the McManus decision––and the state statutes themselves––offer some guidance 
to regulators about where the responsibilities for transparency should ultimately lie.  
Burdening websites, particularly news websites, with such record-keeping raises 
valid First Amendment problems regarding compelled speech.  However, a lack of 
transparency burdens equally important values regarding informed decision-making 
by the electorate.  This clash of values signals the need, in our view, for an 
independent record-keeping body along the lines that New York has established for 
independent expenditure committees.  In New York, record-keeping for online 
political advertising is done by the bipartisan New York State Board of Elections 
rather than the online platforms disseminating political ads.242  Just as independent 
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expenditure committees are required to submit weekly reports detailing contributions 
over $1,000, expenditures over $5,000, and expenditures for online advertising over 
$500 to the Board, New York law requires independent expenditure committees to 
submit copies “of all political communications paid for by the independent 
expenditure committee.”243  For online advertising specifically, the Board maintains 
a publicly accessible online database that includes copies of the ad, scripts of any 
audio or video elements, descriptions of any visual elements, screenshots of ads 
without audio or video elements, and individual images for ads with animated 
elements.244  These records are maintained for five years.245 
We propose that it would be the responsibility of the advertiser to report their ad 
buys to a state election board.  The state election board would maintain such 
information and make it publicly available.  At the federal level, as opposed to placing 
a record-keeping responsibility on online platforms as the Honest Ads Act suggests,246 
this responsibility should be placed with the FEC.  Establishing a record-keeping 
system for online political advertising that places the responsibility of maintaining 
public records with a government agency as opposed to online platforms would 
seemingly avoid the constitutional problems outlined by the Fourth Circuit in 
McManus.  Unlike Maryland’s requirements for online platforms, a system similar to 
New York’s looks more like traditional campaign finance regulations, where there is 
a regulatory relationship between government agencies and “direct participants in the 
political process”247 as opposed to third parties.  These records should contain key 
information to promote transparency around online political advertising, including 
information like copies of the ad, the ad purchaser’s identity, the cost of the ad, and 
information about the audience targeted.  However, as Wood notes about disclosure 
more generally, we must continue to examine our assumptions about disclosure,248 
and this may mean engaging in further research to determine what types of disclosures 
about online political advertising are most effective.  In addition, these revisions to 
state law and the Honest Ads Act should include support for the technical 
infrastructure required to track online political advertising, which is likely to be 
sizeable.  These laws should also be revised to make such data easily available to the 
public.  Finally, these revised provisions should create opportunities for congressional 
review of the law’s disclosure mechanisms and for regular stakeholders to comment.  
The problems posed by online political advertising are not insurmountable.  Even 
the Wild West was eventually conquered and settled.  But such change requires 
focused attention and investment––and a committed effort from candidates, 
committees, platforms, election boards, commissions and lawmakers––to address the 
harms, both real and potential, in future state and federal election cycles.  As the 
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problems uncovered by the Mueller report have demonstrated, nothing less than the 
integrity of the voting process depends on it. 
